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Abstract 
The face inversion effect is a reduction in recognition performance 
for inverted faces compared to upright faces that is greater than 
that typically observed with other stimulus types (e.g. houses; Yin, 
1969). This study investigated the link between second-order 
relational structure and the face inversion effect suggested by 
Diamond and Carey (1986). The idea is that expertise gained as a 
consequence of a great deal of experience with exemplars derived 
from a familiar category, that possess what Diamond and Carey 
term second order relational structure, can produce an improved 
ability to distinguish between and recognise members of this 
category. Because facial features share the same basic spatial 
configuration, i.e. eyes are always above the nose and so on, and 
individual faces vary these spatial arrangements slightly, they have 
second order relational structure. The argument is that our 
experience with this structure underpins our ability to recognize 
faces, and this expertise with faces is lost on inversion because 
inversion disrupts the ability to exploit second order relational 
information. In this paper we report two experiments that confirm 
that we can obtain a strong face inversion effect, and that the 
magnitude of this effect can be reduced by disrupting the second 
order relational structure of the faces. 
Keywords: Inversion effect; face recognition; Thatcher illusion; 
scrambled faces; expertise; perceptual learning. 
Introduction 
Recognition  of  objects that are usually seen in one 
orientation is sometimes strongly  impaired when the same 
objects are turned upside down, showing how intrinsically 
difficult it is to identify them. This has been found to be 
particularly the case for faces, a phenomenon known as the 
face inversion effect.  (Yin,1969). Thus, the fact that 
recognition of human faces is more impaired by inversion 
than is recognition for other stimuli has underlined how 
faces are, in some sense, special. Over the past two decades, 
however, more behavioural evidence has emerged that 
challenges the assumption that facial stimuli are special, not 
the least of which is the demonstration that the  inversion 
effect on recognition memory can be as strong with dogs as 
with faces when the subjects are experts in the identification 
and assessment of specific dog breeds. Given that the only 
stimuli that result in a substantial inversion effect are the 
ones for which the subjects have the necessary expertise 
(Diamond & Carey, 1986), this suggests that the face 
inversion effect may not be due to the fact that facial stimuli 
are subject to special processing because they are facial in 
nature, but instead that there are other factors, such as 
expertise,  which give rise to this effect. Diamond and Carey 
(1986) proposed that it is a special type of information 
“second order relational information” that we depend on 
with increasing expertise. Human faces all have the same 
group of features (eyebrows, eyes, nose, mouth, etc.). All 
faces tend to have in common the same basic disposition  of 
components, such that the eyes are always above the nose 
and so on. Thus, “first order relational information” 
corresponds to the spatial relationship between these 
features of a face, and “second order relational information” 
corresponds to the small variations in these spatial 
relationships that individuate the faces. In one of their 
experiments on detecting grotesqueness, Searcy and Bartlett 
(1996) made faces grotesque by either changing local 
elements, such as blackening teeth, blurring the pupils, or by 
changing the facial configuration. When shown in an 
inverted orientation, faces that were distorted by means of 
configural changes seemed to be more similar to the normal 
version while the “locally distorted face” still looked 
grotesque. Thus, configural changes did not survive the 
inversion process as well as local ones. In another 
experiment, Leder and Bruce (1998) distorted faces so as to 
be more distinctive, either changing local features by giving 
them darker lips, bushier eye brows, etc. or by changing 
configural information to give a shorter mouth to nose 
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spatial relation, etc. Distinctiveness impressions caused by 
distorted configural information disappeared when faces 
were presented in an inverted orientation compared to both 
upright faces and faces distorted in their local aspects. This 
sensitivity of configural distortions to inversion is also 
believed to be the basis of the  “Thatcher illusion” 
(Thompson, 1980). Here, the illusion seems to depend on 
the inversion of mouth and eyes within the face being hard 
to detect (Thompson,1980) when the whole face is 
inverted. The explanation typically offered is that inversion 
reduces the use of configural information in the face, and 
promotes a more componential analysis of the features 
present. In isolation, the mouth and eyes do not look odd, 
and so cause no great reaction in the viewer. When the face 
is shown in its normal orientation, however, we revert to 
configural processing, and this makes the distortions present 
in the mouth and eyes stand out, resulting in a strong 
reaction to the face on the part of most percipients. These 
results all provide evidence for the powerful effect that 
second order relational information has in the processing of 
upright faces relative to inverted faces. One possible 
criticism of this position would be that the nature of the 
difficulty caused by disruption of configural information 
consequent on inversion is still to be explained. The 
suggestion from perceptual learning theories is that 
expertise for faces based on familiarity with them as a class 
might  play a major role in this because this can act via 
configural information, and if the configural processing is 
disrupted by inversion, then this expertise is lost. 
McLaren et al. (1989)  proposed that having acquired  
expertise with a category represented by a prototype (by 
means of experience with it) will tend to lead to the unique 
discriminating elements of exemplars constructed from that 
category becoming more salient, more active, compared 
with the prototypical ones that tend to be common across 
exemplars. This is a consequence of latent inhibition 
accruing more to the prototypical component of the stimulus 
representation in the course of experience with the category.  
This model of associative learning makes predictions about 
the inversion effect which are consistent with McLaren’s 
(1997) experiments. The first experiment demonstrated that 
the  inversion effect is dependent both on the subject’s 
familiarity with a category and on the category being 
defined by a prototype. Subjects were exposed to a set of 
chequerboards and were then asked to categorize them into 
two different categories. This was followed by a 
discrimination task which included two pairs of 
chequerboards (one pair in an upright and the other pair in 
an inverted orientation) from a familiar category plus two 
pairs of chequerboards from a novel category (again one 
pair upright the other inverted). The results showed that 
familiarity with a  prototype-defined category possessing 
second order relational structure gave subjects an enhanced 
ability to discriminate between exemplars of that category in 
an upright orientation. This benefit was lost when the 
stimuli were inverted. Finally, in a second experiment this 
time using a delayed matching  task in the test phase, it was 
shown that experience with a prototype-defined category 
once again resulted in  a significant inversion effect. The 
importance of these results is that they imply that it should 
be possible to ensure that latent inhibition, produced by 
means of familiarity with a  category possessing the 
requisite structure, will lead to perceptual learning that 
results in an inversion effect for exemplars of that category.  
In the present study, we addressed the link between 
expertise and the face inversion effect made by perceptual 
learning theories. In Experiment 1, our goal was to obtain a 
strong inversion effect for  normal face stimuli  and we 
predicted a reduced inversion effect for Thatcherised face 
stimuli. These latter stimuli are well matched to normal 
faces in terms of complexity, but they suffer from disrupted 
second order-relational information even when upright, 
which should reduce some of the effect of expertise, and so 
inversion should have less of an effect on them. This theme 
is further developed in Experiment 2 where we investigated 
the inversion effect using a new set of faces (scrambled 
faces) that were  characterized by complete disruption of 
both first and second-order relational structure whilst still 
maintaining all the local features typical of normal faces.  
Experiment 1 
Materials 
The study used a set of 128 images in total. The faces 
were standardized to grey scale images on a black 
background using Adobe Photoshop.  Only male faces were 
used.  This was to enable the hair to be cropped on each 
image without cropping the ears (because males tend to 
have shorter hair with ears visible whereas females often 
have longer hair covering the ears). A programme called 
Gimp 2.6 was used to manipulate the 128 stimuli. Any 
given face stimulus was prepared in four different versions 
i.e. normal  upright, normal inverted, Thatcherised upright 
and  Thatcherised  inverted which were used in a 
counterbalanced fashion across participants so that each face 
was equally often used in each condition of the experiment 
Thatcherised faces were produced by rotating the mouth and 
each of the eyes (individually) by 180 degrees.  Examples of 
the stimuli used are given in Figure 1.  The experiment was 
run using Superlab Version 4.0.7b. installed on an iMac 
computer.    
 
 
 
Figure 1; Examples of stimuli used in Experiment 1 
showing the  four different conditions. The dimensions of 
the stimuli were 5.63cm x 7.84cm. The stimuli were 
presented at  a resolution of 1280 x 960 . Participants sat 1m 
away from the screen on which the images were presented. 
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Participants 
The participants were 24 psychology undergraduates at the 
University of Exeter.  
Procedure 
The study consisted of a ‘study phase’ and a ‘test phase’. In 
the study phase each participant was shown 4 types of faces 
with 16 photos for each face type (giving a total of 64 
faces).  These faces will be termed the “familiar” 
(designated as 1) faces for that participant. The face types 
were: 1-Normal Inverted faces (1NI); 2-Normal Upright 
faces (1NU); 3- Thatcherised Inverted faces (1TI) and 4-
Thatcherised Upright faces (1TU). In the test phase another 
64 novel faces (designated as 2) split into the same four face 
types were added to this set. Each facial stimulus had a 
unique identifying number, to make sure that individual 
faces never appeared in more than one face type at a time 
during the experiment. To simplify their use in the 
experiment, the facial stimuli available were divided into 
sets of 16 giving 8 sets of stimuli, and each participant 
group was shown a different combination of the 64 facial 
stimuli split over the 8 sets. Each participant saw the facial 
stimuli corresponding to their participant group in a 
different order. The first event that participants saw after the 
instructions consisted of a warning cue (a fixation cross in 
the centre of the screen) presented for 1 second. This was 
followed by a face that was presented for 3 seconds. Then 
the fixation cross was repeated and another face presented 
until all 64 facial stimuli had been seen. Once all 64 faces 
were shown, the programme moved to the beginning of the 
old/new recognition task. Participants were told that they 
were about to see more faces presented one at a time in 
random order. They were asked to press the ‘.’ key If they 
recognised the face or to press ‘x’ if they did not. Each 
participant within each participant group was then shown (in 
random order) the 64 faces they had already seen intermixed 
with a further 64 unseen faces. These unseen faces were 
taken from the sets of facial stimuli not used during the 
study phase. Table 1 shows the combinations of faces 
presented to each participant group. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Combinations of facial stimuli presented to each 
participant group. 
 
The procedure for the old/new recognition task was that 
after the warning cue (1 second), a face was shown for 4 
seconds and participants had to respond during this period. 
If participants pressed the wrong key (i.e. a key other than 
‘x’ or ‘.’)  the feedback ‘Wrong key’ was shown for 2 
seconds prior to the next face appearing on the screen. If 
participants were too slow in responding (i.e. took longer 
than 4 seconds), the message ‘Too slow’ appeared on the 
screen. Since in the old/new recognition task there were 128 
faces to consider, three participant breaks were incorporated 
after every 32 faces. At the end of the experiment 
participants were thanked for participating. 
Results 
The data from all 24 participants contributed to the signal 
detection  d' analysis.  Figure 2 gives the results for the 
mean d' obtained for each face type.  A planned comparison 
was used to examine whether or not there was a significant 
inversion effect for normal facial stimuli. This gave a highly 
significant advantage F(1,23) = 22.24, p<.001 one-tailed, for 
normal upright faces vs. normal inverted faces, and another 
planned comparison showed a similar (although not 
significant) trend for Thatcherised upright vs. Thatcherised 
inverted faces, F(1,23) = 1.88, p=.09 one-tailed.  There was 
also a significant interaction between face type and 
orientation, F(1,23) = 5.04, p<.02.  This reflected the fact 
that the inversion effect in the normal faces was 
significantly greater than that in the Thatcherised faces. To 
further investigate this result, the effect of face type on the 
recognition of upright faces was also analyzed.  Normal 
upright faces were recognized significantly better than 
Thatcherised upright faces,F(1,23) = 8.99, p<.003, but there 
was no significant difference in the recognition of normal 
inverted faces and Thatcherised inverted faces. Thus, it 
would seem that the reduction in the inversion effect for 
Thatcherised faces is due to the impact that Thatcherisation 
has on the upright faces rather than the inverted ones. 
 
Figure 2: The X axis shows the four different stimulus 
conditions, whereas the Y axis shows the d' means for each 
of the four facial conditions in the test phase of Experiment 
1. 
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Discussion 
In agreement with the literature on face recognition, the 
results of this first experiment have shown a clear effect of 
inversion for normal faces. By way of contrast, there was no 
significant effect for Thatcherised faces (although there was 
a trend in this direction), and the effect for normal faces was 
significantly greater than for Thatcherised faces. This 
confirms that we can obtain a strong inversion effect, and 
the magnitude of this effect can be reduced by disrupting the 
second order relational structure of the faces (Diamond & 
Carey, 1986). Thatcherisation does not alter any of the local 
features, nor does it greatly change first order structure, but 
it does change the spatial relationship between features 
where the eyes or mouth are involved. The fact that this 
significantly reduced recognition performance to upright 
Thatcherised faces compared to normal upright faces is 
entirely consistent with our (and Diamond and Carey's, 
1986) hypothesis, as is the fact that Thatcherisation had 
little impact on recognition performance to inverted faces. 
Nevertheless, Thatcherised faces clearly still have some 
unaltered second order relational information, and according 
to our hypothesis it is this that will enable them to benefit 
from our life experience with faces and so produce a trend 
towards an inversion effect. The logical next step is to 
construct a  set of stimuli with all the features of a normal 
face, but with no second order relational information at all. 
Thus, we devised Experiment 2, in which we used the same 
experimental procedures as in Experiment 1 but this time 
rather than Thatcherised faces we created a set of scrambled 
faces.  By simply re-arranging the local features of a face 
we hoped to control for stimulus complexity compared to 
normal faces, but completely eradicate the familiar first and 
second order relational information. 
Experiment 2 
Materials 
Six facial features were used for scrambling i.e. the mouth, 
nose, two ears and the two eyes (including eyebrows). 
Scrambling was done by selecting at random one feature of 
the face and moving it to the forehead (chosen because this 
is the widest space inside the face and so can accommodate 
any feature). Following this, a second feature was selected 
and moved to the space left empty by the first feature, and 
so on until all the 6 facial features had been moved. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Examples showing the four different conditions. 
Participants 
24 psychology undergraduates at the University of Exeter 
took part in the experiment.  The study was 
counterbalanced, as in Experiment 1, by splitting the 
participants into 8 groups. 
Procedure 
The procedure was exactly the same as that used in 
Experiment 1.  Firstly, in the study phase, participants were 
asked to look at a set of faces shown on the computer screen 
one at a time in random order.  Following this first phase of 
the experiment, the participants were presented with an 
old/new recognition task.  The participants were told to 
press  “.” on the computer keyboard if they had seen the 
face before in the study phase, or “x” if they had not seen it 
before.We predicted that we would obtain a strong inversion 
effect for normal faces and no inversion effect for scrambled 
faces. 
Results 
The data from all 24 participants were used in the signal 
detection d' analysis. Figure 4 gives the results for the mean 
d' for each face type. Once again planned comparisons 
revealed a significant inversion effect for normal faces,  
F(1,23) =20.00, p<.001, none for scrambled faces, F<1, and 
a significant interaction between face type and orientation, 
F(1,23)=7.78, p<.01. Performance in recognizing normal 
upright faces was also significantly better than recognition 
for scrambled upright faces, F(1,23) =26.62, p<.001, but this 
time there was also a significant difference in the 
recognition of normal inverted faces and scrambled inverted 
faces, F(1,23) =3.37, p<.05. Finally normal inverted faces 
were recognized numerically better than scrambled upright 
faces but not significantly so F(1,23) =2.75, p=.06.  
 
 
 
 Figure 4; The X axis shows the four different stimulus 
conditions, whereas the Y axis shows the d' means for each 
of the four facial conditions in the recognition phase of 
Experiment 2.  
Discussion 
In agreement with our predictions there is a strong inversion 
effect for normal faces (upright better than inverted) 
whereas there is no inversion effect at all for scrambled 
faces. This is consistent with our hypothesis that 
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participants when presented with scrambled faces in an 
upright orientation, which are affected by the complete 
disruption of the usual second-order relational information, 
would not have any expertise for those upright faces. Thus, 
when the same scrambled faces are presented in an inverted 
orientation participants would not suffer any loss of 
expertise, as there was none to start with. Hence, we do not 
observe any inversion effect. The new finding here is the 
significant difference between normal inverted faces and 
scrambled faces, with participants actually performing better 
in recognizing inverted normal faces than scrambled faces 
in both orientations (though only significantly better than 
scrambled faces that have been inverted). We return to this 
finding in the general discussion. 
General Discussion 
The two experiments reported here provide clear evidence 
that second order relational information is indeed critical in 
driving the substantial inversion effect for faces. When we 
disrupted the second order relational information of our set 
of faces by inverting (rotating by 1800) the eyes and the 
mouth, producing Thatcherised faces, the intention was to 
disrupt exactly the information that Diamond and Carey 
identified as the basis of our expertise with faces whilst 
leaving other types of information (first order, local) 
relatively intact. Our Thatcherised faces are themselves 
defined in terms of a prototype (if you averaged the 
Thatcherised faces you'd get a prototypical Thatcherised 
face as a result), and so in some sense possess second order 
relational structure. But it is not structure that our 
participant’s would be familiar with when entering the 
experiment, and so any effect of expertise would be 
confined to those aspects of the second order structure that 
had not changed (the spatial relationship between the nose 
and the ears for example). We have hypothesized that it is 
the combination of second order relational structure and 
experience with it that leads to expertise – and this is the 
basis of the interaction between Face Type and Orientation 
that we have repeatedly demonstrated in this paper. Our 
conclusion is that the inversion effect observed with normal 
faces is driven by our ability to exploit second order 
relational structure in categories of stimuli that both possess 
the necessary structure and that are sufficiently familiar. If 
this structure is disrupted, then so is the inversion effect. If 
it is eliminated entirely then so is the inversion effect. So 
far, so good; we will now subject this account to greater 
scrutiny in the context of our results and the theory of 
perceptual learning first put forward by McLaren, Kaye and 
Mackintosh (1989) and subsequently developed in McLaren 
and Mackintosh (2000, 2002).  
The case for Thatcherised faces seems quite straightforward 
and has already been given in the discussion of Experiment 
1. By rotating the eyes and mouth we do not alter the first 
order or local feature information to any great extent, but we 
do change the second order structure involving those 
features. If this is important for recognition, then we should 
see an effect on upright Thatcherised faces, and we do, as 
they are recognised significantly worse than normal upright 
faces. If inversion removes our ability to make use of this 
information, then the fact that it has been disrupted should 
not matter, and indeed, inverted Thatcherised faces do not 
seem to suffer in comparison with inverted normal faces. 
The results of Experiment 1, then, are entirely consistent 
with our version of Diamond and Carey's (1986) hypothesis 
with respect to face recognition. 
Experiment 2 is superficially somewhat similar in its results, 
but actually reflects the consequences of a quite different 
manipulation. True, the local features are unchanged for the 
scrambled faces relative to the normal ones, but now both 
first and second order information are no longer in their 
familiar form, and the variation from scrambled face to 
scrambled face means that, in some real sense, there is no 
way to develop expertise with any second or first order 
relational information as a result of experience with the 
stimulus set. The effect of this is, in part, the expected one 
in that any inversion effect for the scrambled faces 
disappears. But the overall performance to scrambled faces, 
whether in an upright or inverted orientation, is now below 
not only that for upright normal faces (which would be 
expected) but also below that obtained for inverted normal 
faces, significantly so in the case of the inverted scrambled 
faces. This is a challenging result which stands in stark 
contrast to the finding that recognition performance for 
inverted Thatcherised faces is no different to that for 
inverted normal faces.  If it was the case that we had simply 
eradicated second order relational information in the 
scrambled faces, and that this information was the source of 
the inversion effect in normal faces, then we might have 
expected scrambling to produce faces that (in any 
orientation) supported the same level of recognition 
performance as inverted normal faces. The finding that these 
faces are now recognized significantly worse than inverted 
normal faces indicates that something more is involved.  
One possible explanation for this effect starts by suggesting 
that inverted normal faces may still be benefiting from some 
effects of expertise. After all, they contain standard facial 
features that have not been themselves changed apart from 
rotation as a configuration so they are recognizable as faces. 
Clearly it would be unwise to assume that all effects of 
expertise disappear under inversion, perhaps the use of 
second order relational information is only attenuated in 
these circumstances.  If this is so, however, then some 
explanation of why the inverted Thatcherised faces are not 
worse recognized than inverted normal faces is needed.  It 
would be tempting at this point to note that, because of the 
180º rotation of the eyes and mouth used to Thatcherise the 
faces, when a Thatcherised face is inverted the eyes and 
mouth are now in their normal orientation – could this offset 
what otherwise would be a disadvantage for Thatcherised 
faces compared to their normal inverted counterparts? One 
problem with this explanation is that the upright scrambled 
faces (for which no local features are inverted) are also 
worse recognised (p=.06) than inverted normal faces,  and 
not distinguishably different from inverted scrambled faces, 
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which suggests that having features in their correct 
orientation is not, in itself, enough to confer much of an 
advantage.  
Another possible explanation appeals to the fact that by 
using scrambled faces we have disrupted both first and 
second order relational structure. To make the point with 
somewhat greater force, with normal faces it is clear that 
one is dealing with a face whether it is upright or inverted. 
The same applies to Thatcherised faces, there is something 
odd about them in an upright orientation but there is no 
doubt that, upright or inverted, they are faces. This cannot 
so easily be said of scrambled faces, even though they 
possess all the local features of a face, the loss of first order 
structure makes it relatively hard to describe these stimuli as 
"face like" in either orientation. Perhaps this is the key  then, 
to the poor performance with these faces, poor performance 
which is paradoxical in the sense that these faces, by virtue 
of the variation in the spatial arrangement of their features 
actually differ more from one another objectively than 
normal or Thatcherised faces. This should make them easier 
to discriminate and recognise, and the fact that it does not 
we would argue is testament to the strong influence of 
expertise on face recognition, though we note that it is also 
consistent with the notion of a specialised processing 
mechanism for faces. In the next section we consider one 
theory that offers an explanation for the development of 
expertise with faces that might be able to accommodate our 
results. 
The MKM theory of perceptual learning (McLaren, Kaye 
and Mackintosh, 1989; see also McLaren and Mackintosh, 
2000, 2002) suggests that features that are associatively 
predicted by other features are less salient than relatively 
unpredicted features. The associations that make the 
predictions are built up in the course of experience with the 
stimuli, but can only come about if there is a reliable 
relationship between features for these associations to 
exploit. Upright faces possess this quality, the first order 
structure is highly predictable, the second order structure 
less so. Thus the first order structure becomes relatively less 
salient with experience, and the second order structure can 
then be more easily used to individuate faces. On this 
theory, then, the scrambled faces should be the baseline for 
performance where all benefits of experience with the first 
order structure of faces is lost making them much less 
discriminable from one another. The theory would also have 
it that it is this benefit that is responsible for inversion 
effects, which fits well with the lack of a difference between 
upright and inverted scrambled faces. But what of 
Thatcherised faces? The theory predicts that, in the case of 
upright Thatcherised faces, the rotated eyes and mouth will 
have changed such that the predictions made for them (by 
other features in the face) will no longer match with the 
reality. This mismatch makes these features look salient and 
enhances their "oddness". Unfortunately, many of these 
salient features will tend to be those typical of 
Thatcherisation, and so will be common across Thatcherised 
faces, and will not help discrimination and recognition, 
making upright Thatcherised faces worse than upright 
normal faces in the experiments of the type reported here. 
Now consider an inverted Thatcherised face. We know that 
it does not look very different to its normal inverted 
equivalent, and performance to both in our experiments is 
roughly the same. The conclusion we draw is that features 
are predicted to be in certain spatial locations (because we 
know this is an inverted face), but that this happens without 
making second order structure relatively salient. The 
(somewhat speculative) claim being made here is that 
inversion of a stimulus that is recogniseable as a face has the 
effect of disrupting our expertise for second order structure, 
whilst maintaining (at least in part) some reduction in the 
salience of first order structure. Thus, inverted faces benefit 
from this loss of salience of features that would otherwise 
be common to all inverted faces (their basic spatial 
arrangement) whilst losing the sensitivity to second order 
structure that makes us so good at dealing with upright 
faces, and which is the basis of the inversion effect. 
Eliminating familiar first order structure by scrambling a 
face reveals the advantage that this confers even for inverted 
faces.  
Further research will be needed to evaluate this account of 
our results, but our data clearly suggest that there is a role 
for both first and second order structure in face recognition, 
that we argue can be understood in terms of experience-
based expertise. 
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